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Abstract—Cyber-physical security is a major con-
cern for the new generation of trains. In fact, trains
are increasingly relying on automation, control and
communication technologies in order to improve the
efficiency and safety of their services as well as the
comfort of passengers. This dependency introduces
certainly new vulnerabilities and entry points to the
system which exposes the system to new threat sce-
narios. This paper deals with cyber-physical security
aspects of Train Control and Monitoring Systems
(TCMSs). We analyse vulnerabilities and character-
istics of railway threat landscape including potential
threats, threats agents and motivations. We discuss,
also, direct impacts and cascading consequences on
the whole system as well as the risk generated.
Index Terms—Railway System, TCMS, Cyber-
physical security, Threat, Vulnerability, Risk
I. Introduction
Technological advances and ongoing digitalization are
continuously improving safety and efficiency of railways
systems. New generation of trains will use real-time rail
information and on-line environmental data in combina-
tion with on-board references to achieve optimal control
of the train traction and braking while keeping with
travel schedule and reducing energy consumption. Train
passengers travelling experience will be improved as well
through services such as connected infotainment, realtime
information, etc. These innovations are accomplished
using networked devices along with advanced remote
access and control capabilities. Introducing such features
for safety critical systems like railway systems brings not
only improvements but also new challenges concerning
cyber-physical security.
Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly automated
and sophisticated. Their impact on critical infrastruc-
tures, in particular railway systems, can lead to catas-
trophic consequences, no matter whether they are the
intended target or not. Attacks on operational systems
could lead to the disruption or the unavailability of the
rail transport itself. When informational systems are
attacked it can lead to the unavailability of services
for the passenger, like being unable to buy a ticket or
digitally check a ticket into the system. Consequently,
cyber-attacks on the transportation sector create a large
impact on society and people’s daily life varying from
direct effects like delays, accidents, injuries or even deaths,
to indirect effects, like socio-economic effects.
The work presented in this paper is conducted within the
European project Roll2Rail under the task "security
for TCMS"that aims to identify convenient security
countermeasures and to define required protection lev-
els for each TCMS asset. Yet, such outcomes can be
accomplished using a coherent and strategic approach
that encompasses all cyber-physical security aspects. The
starting point of the selected approach is studying the
system vulnerabilities and threat landscape. As such, in
this paper, we present security threats and vulnerabilities
assessments of TCMS with the aim of identifying threats,
quantifying impacts and expected losses, and analyzing
criticality of the system assets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II shortly introduces the System under Consid-
eration (SuC). We analyze the system vulnerabilities in
section III. Then, we discuss railway threat landscape
through a threat model, actors and motivation analysis
in section IV, and present potential impacts and risks on
railway systems in section V. A detailed threat analysis
of some assets of the SuC is presented in section VI.
Finally, the paper is concluded, in section VII.
II. System Identification
The starting point of a cyber-physical security analysis
is performing a clear identification of the SuC. This step
consists in illustrating the SuC assets and Industrial
Automation Control System (IACS) included in the
system, identifying the access points to the system and
defining the security perimeter. Thus, in this section, we
detail the proposed architecture of the SuC which is the
TCMS, as well as its different functionalities. This step
helps to identify the sensitive assets of the SuC.
The TCMS is mainly responsible for providing basic
train control functions: -inaugurate the train network,
-determine train topology and configuration, -provide
orientation information for coupled elements, -manage
leading vehicle information, -distribute train topology
and configuration, -confirm train configuration, -manage
train network operation, -manage train network access
and -transmit data. Nevertheless, with the recent ad-
vances of Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) integrated in the railway industry, a TCMS is
expected to manage a set of sophisticated applications
not only for a more reliable train control, but also for
operator oriented services and customer comfort purposes.
As such, in order to separate the control system ICT from
the comfort ICT, the SuC is clustered into 3 functional
domains [1] [2] [3] [4]:
Figure 1: SuC functional domains based model [1]
• TCMS domain includes both safety related and non-
safety related TCMS functions. The functions of this do-
main, which are mandatory to ensure safe train movement
and carrying the payload, are : main control, train radio,
air conditioning, propulsion, brakes, electricity, lavatories,
lighting, supporting systems, passenger announcement
system, external doors and internal doors, European
Train Control System (ETCS), Automatic Train Protec-
tion (ATP), On-board Driving Data Recording System
(ODDRS), passenger alarm system and Closed-circuit
television (CCTV) for rear view purposes.
• Operator Oriented Services (OOS) are auxiliary ser-
vices for proper train operation. Funtions of OOS domain
are: priority logic, CCTV for video surveillance purposes,
infotainment in train embedded devices, mobile phone am-
plifiers, automatic passenger counting,vehicle positioning,
fare management or ticketing, driver assistance system, E-
schedule, diagnostics and Condition Based Maintenance
(CBM) systems and Passenger Information System (PIS)
(including automatic announcements).
• Customer Oriented Services (COS) include the func-
tions executed by passenger devices such as: access for
the passenger’s devices (e.g. Wi-Fi access points), Access
to the public internet and passenger info-portal.
This three-level modelling, presented in Figure 1, aims
to increase flexibility, scalability, and adaptability of the
system for future evolutions.
To accomplish all functionalities mentioned above, system
actors and devices need to exchange data and commands
using communication networks in different communica-
tion schemes such as intra-train, train-to-train and train-
to-ground communications. Communication networks for
future railway systems are expected to be heterogeneous
composed of a mixture of several networks and radio
access technologies that can be simultaneously accessed
by different system actors and devices in order to improve
the capacity of communications. For instance, New De-
pendable Rolling Stock for a more Sustainable, Intelligent
and Comfortable Rail Transport in Europe (Roll2Rail)
proposes the use of an heterogeneous network architecture
combining wireless technologies, such cellular network
like LTE, IEEE 802.11, RFID and wired networks where
the advantages and specificities of each access network
can be taken into consideration [2]. For safety and
security purposes, access between different domains will
be limited. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, the proposed
architecture includes also network protection devices
between different functional domains since their security
and safety requirements differ.
III. Vulnerability Assessment
The integration of cyber-physical systems into critical
infrastructures brings not only benefits but also a new set
of vulnerabilities for the whole system. The exploitation
of such cyber-vulnerabilities can lead to physical conse-
quences. The vulnerabilities of railway systems can be
divided in two categories [5]: general cyber-vulnerabilities,
and vulnerabilities coming from the specificity of railway
systems.
1− General vulnerabilities for IACS
• Wireless and cellular communications. Although such
communication technologies bring several advantages to
the system, they introduce typical vulnerabilities because
communications take place ’through the air’ using radio
frequencies and thus it is difficult to prevent physical
access to them, especially in open and accessible areas
like public railway infrastructure. The risk of attack such
as interception and intrusion is greater than with wired
networks.
• Increasing system automation. Although automation
control improves safety and global system operations by
removing the possibility of human error, it introduces
new vulnerabilities since the surface of attack increases
and therefore the risk of attack is higher.
2− Specific vulnerabilities for railway use case
• Scale and complexity of railway systems. Railway
infrastructure is a large-scale international infrastructure.
Applying networked technologies across large railway sys-
tems increases number of access points to the system, and
thus increases the difficulty and cost. Thereby, securing
communications and connectivity between mobile devices
on a large area is a complicated task.
• Cohabitation between legacy and new systems. Since
railway infrastructure is a shared common infrastructure
used by different railway companies, the use of legacy
equipment and infrastructures introduces new vulnera-
bilities.
• Multiple independent systems. In addition to legacy
problems, railway systems are composed of diverse
systems such as sensors, computers, payment systems,
emergency systems,etc. It is crucial, but also difficult, to
ensure smooth interfacing, communication and securing
between such independent and heterogeneous systems.
This increases system vulnerabilities.
• Access to real-time data. Reliable operation of the
system requires a non-stop real-time data exchange which
may result in costly maintenance and periods of service
downtime.
• Online passenger services such as timetabling, passenger
information, ticket booking, are also susceptible to cyber
attacks.
IV. Railway Threat Landscape
A threat landscape provides an overview of potential
threats against the SuC and their characteristics. To
this end, in this section, we are identifying the set of
threats against a railway system, threat actors and their
motivation to attack.
A. Potential threats against TCMS
Railway system is exposed to many types of attacks
of different nature. In this section, we present a threat
taxonomy that covers mainly cyber-security threats;
which are threats directly applied to ICT assets and
thus affecting SuC operations. We also present non-IT
threats to cover threats to SuC physical assets that
are necessary for the system operation. Based on recent
studies published by European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA) [6] [7] [5], threats
can be classified into physical threats, accidental threats,
disasters and outages, failure and malfunctions (system
failure) and malicious actions.
• Physical attacks. This type of threats is caused by
intentional offensive actions aiming to achieve maximum
distraction, disruption, destruction, exposure, alteration,
theft or unauthorized accessing of assets such as infras-
tructure, hardware or ICT connections.
• Accidental damages. These are caused by unintentional
insider actions [8] including human errors [9]. Uninten-
tional mistakes can be made by authorized employees,
users, developers, and testers during data entry, opera-
tions, or system or application development. Such errors
can affect system integrity and stability.
• Malicious activities. This type of threats contains
cyber-attacks and intentional nefarious activities or abuse
targeting railway system assets through digital assets.
B. Threat actors and motivations
Railway systems can be threaten by several types of
actors with different motivations. In the following, we
present an taxonomy of threat actors against railway
systems in order of importance:
• Nation states is an emerging, yet critical, class of
threat actor against critical infrastructures in general,
including railway systems. In fact, these systems provide
the essential services for the nation’s society and serve
as the backbone of its economy, security, and health.
As such, they become a significant targets in modern
cyber-warfare. Attacks performed by such actors can be
politically or economically motivated.
• Non-state organized threat groups. This category
includes mainly cyber-terrorists but also cyber-fighters
and cyber-criminals . Common to all these threat actors
is that they can be organized on local, national or
international level. However, their motivations and skill
level vary. Cyber-terrorists have political or religious
motivations and their capability varies from low to high.
Whereas, cyber-fighters are patriotic motivated groups of
citizens with strong feelings when their political, national
or religious values seem to be threatened by another group
and are capable of launching cyber-attack to protest and
. Cyber-criminals are organized groups with quite high
skill level that attack systems for financial gain.
• Insider threat agents including employees (staff,
contractors, operational staff) and third party (vendors,
system integrators, and other third party service and
product providers) are considered as dangerous threat
actors since they have insider access to private facilities
and resources and a significant amount of knowledge that
allows them to place effective attacks against sensitive
parts of the system.
• Hacktivists are attackers, in many cases with limited
technical skills, but rely on ready-to-use attack kits and
services, or even third-party botnets, to cause damage to
a system e.g., denial of service, defacement as a means
of protest. Their protests are often politically motivated.
• Business-oriented attackers is a traditional cate-
gory of attackers that are interested in performing abusive
activities against competitor-controlled cyber-physical
systems in order to cause concrete damage and gain
business advantages.
• Casual cyber-attackers that usually have little or
no technical skills, launching attacks against connected
control systems can cause serious damage, much higher
than in the case of simple IT system.
It is important to note that individual non state attackers
(such as hacktivists, business-oriented attackers and
casual attackers) could also be considered by nation states
as allies in a low intensity warfare against an opponent
nation.
The aforementioned actors are driven by several cate-
gories of motivations. We identify two main motivations:
• Political purposes. Since railway systems are part
of a nation critical infrastructure, attacking them is
considered as a strategical warfare weapon that may
cause severe consequences varying from endangering
people lives to financial loss and economical impacts. As
these systems become increasingly reliant on ICT, they
merge as a important target for political motivated cyber
attacks. These warefare strategies are already used and
they have been multiplied in the few past years. They
can be used to cause physical damage or exfiltrating
intelligence or secret information. Some well-publicized
example is the attack conducted on Iranian Nuclear
Facilities by using the worm Stuxnet [10]. According to
[11], Stuxnet was launched by the US and Israel several
years ago, in an attempt to sabotage IranâĂŹs nuclear
program. Actors such as nation states and hacktivists
fall in this category.
• Financial purposes. Transportation systems, in-
cluding railway systems, are the backbone of national
economies, providing connections for people and goods,
access to jobs and services, and enabling trade and
economic growth. Attacking such systems results in
financial loss to the service providers, but also other
cascading consequences on other domains. At railway
operator level, attacks can be financially motivated in
order to cause business disruption and sales loss. This
can cause significant long-term economic impact when
reputation of the operators and trust of customers are
impacted [12]. Financial motivated attacks are usually
performed by business-oriented actors, but also by nation
states actors driven by economic reasons. This category
of motivation also existed before critical infrastructures
became an appealing and sensitive target.
V. Risk on railway systems
A risk is defined as the potential that a given threat will
successfully exploit vulnerabilities and thereby produce
a negative impact on the system. From operator perspec-
tive, the most important aspect is the train movement, for
that, security concern is first integrity, then availability
and finally confidentiality. In fact, loss of integrity could
lead to accidents or collisions, whereas loss of availability
would bring the railway system to a halt. Loss of
confidentiality is less of an immediate threat, but might
result in the leak of sensitive operational information.
From passenger perspective, negative impacts can be
confidentiality and privacy problems (since the system
uses sensing, tracking, real-time behaviour evaluation
and automated decisions), interruption and disturbance
of transport services resulting in disruption of their
daily lives, etc. However, the most critical impact is
when passengers health and safety are affected. Indeed,
passengers safety is the priority to all railway systems
actors, nonetheless, some incidents may endanger health
and safety, not to mention threats coming from terrorism
that need to be accounted for when protecting railway
systems and infrastructure.
The aforementioned impacts can affect one or many areas.
We distinguish 3 categories of risk based on the impacted
area [13]. For each area, we define 3 levels of severity.
• Safety : Risks impacting safety differ in terms of sever-
ity. In fact, a risk can result in (level1) light and moderate
injuries and/or minor damage to the environment, (level2)
severe injuries and/or large damage to the environment
and even (level3) life-threatening and fatal injuries and/or
extreme damage to the environment.
• Financial : Financial impacts vary from undesirable
financial damage and impact on the public image of the
company(level1), to substantial financial damage and a se-
rious impact on the public image of the company(level2),
and even existence-threatening financial damage and
severe impact to the public image of the company such as
the incident may incur people suing the company(level3).
• Operational : Impacts on operational aspects may
affect comfort functionalities, however the vehicle can be
used but with some restrictions(level1). It can also lead
to affect an important functionality but the train still
can be used, only with massive restrictions(level2). In
the worst cases, one or more fundamental functions may
be affected such as the train become unusable(level3).
VI. Threat analysis
In this section, we present a detailed threat analysis for
TCMS. We describe potential threats, the direct impacts
on the attacked asset, the cascading consequences on
the whole system, the impacted area (marked I.A)(S, F
or O for safety, financial, operational respectively) and
the risk level (1, 2 or 3 as defined in paragraph V).In
our original work, we performed the analysis for all
system assets. In this paper, due to space limitation,
we selected two assets of a railway system with different
functionalities and levels of criticality: propulsion system
from TCMS domain and CCTV surveillance system from
OOS domain.
Table I presents a threat analysis of the propulsion system
responsible for the movement of a train. The analysis
shows that threats on propulsion system (and this is
also true for all TCMS domain functions) target mainly
the availability (blocking , disconnection, destruction,
etc) and integrity (changing configuration, erroneous
administration, etc) of the system. Such actions may
result in catastrophic consequences on train operation
(maximum security level for operational aspects) and
thus on passengers safety (maximum security level for
safety). This also lead to severe financial impacts for the
train operator, but railway sector in general.
OOS domain CCTV surveillance system is responsible
for managing surveillance sources, collecting surveillance
information, analyzing surveillance functions, displaying
surveillance information (selected, or triggered by alarm
source) and recording surveillance information. CCTV
asset at OOS domain does not cover CCTV for rear
view. A threat analysis of CCTV surveillance system is
presented in Table II. As shown in this analysis, threats
on OOS CCTV affect the system integrity and availability
but also customers confidentiality since sensitive data
about particular passengers or particular shipped goods
and their location in the train may be shared with
unauthorized entities. Attacking CCTV system my be a
step behind bigger attack on the train (such as criminal or
terrorist attacks). For that, attacking the CCTV system
may severely affect safety of the passengers and vehicle
although it does not directly affect train operations.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we performed security threats and
vulnerabilities assessments for TCMS. We also presented
some results from the detailed threat analysis. This
work was conducted as a part of Roll2Rail project.
It presents the first step in a selected methodology to
establish a cyber-physical secure TCMS. Throughout
this analysis, we deduced that the absolute majority of
threats targets mainly integrity and availability of TCMS
services. The violation of these security properties by
attacks against many train subsystems and especially
against communication services can lead to the most
severe consequences or even catastrophic. Regarding
data confidentiality, it is to be considered only for
COS and video surveillance from OOS. Further, we will
continue the security risk assessment process. As such, a
detailed risk assessment will be elaborated to evaluate
the criticality of the identified threats on railway systems,
and to help suggesting more efficient countermeasures
for securing TCMS.
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